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A New Social Darwinism ? 
 
Michael Rustin 
 
 
Biological Darwinism 
 
First, I would like to make a distinction  between ‘biological Darwinism’ and 
the transposition by way of analogy or metaphor  of Darwinian ideas of 
variation, replication and selection to the social sphere.  Some  versions of 
‘biological Darwinism’ have been very unwelcome to social scientists, who 
have defended, often as a radical social constructionism,  the idea that the 
‘social’  is not determined in any way by biological substrates. 
 
I regard this rejection of Darwinist explanations as wrong – after all, mortality 
and reproduction are natural facts, and all individuals and societies and 
individuals have to cope with these.  Biology has a primary causal role in 
human affairs, mediated by social process as it must be. I also  think that 
some strictly Darwinian ideas, applied to the ‘social’ are illuminating, though I 
do not think of myself as a ‘social Darwinist’.   
 
I have in mind the investigations of the development of human infants and 
children, as these have been studied by attachment theorists following the 
work of John Bowlby (1972, 1973, 1988) and by psychoanalysts (of whom 
Bowlby was originally one). (For comparison of these two perspectives, see 
Fonagy 2001). Both of these theoretical approaches  draw attention to the 
similarities between the needs of mammals, in particular primates, in their 
early nurture, and the needs of human infants.  In Bowlby’s terms, if human 
infants are deprived of a secure attachment to a sustaining mother figure in 
their first year or two of life, some of the capacities which they would develop 
in those conditions will be damaged in their absence.  They  will be likely to 
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become more insecure, anxious,  dependent or conflictful, and will be more 
likely to have difficulties in fulfilling the role they may later have as parents. 
Impressive empirical studies (Bretherton and Waters 1985) have validated 
and elaborated these ideas, enabling  investigations of the learned modes of 
attachment of parents, inferred from their descriptions of their own children, to 
predict the probable modes of attachment of children, even yet unborn ( 
Fonagy et al. 1991) Current political programmes directed to improving the 
qualities of nurture in the ‘early years’ draw on these ideas and findings.  
 
Sarah Blaffer Hrdy   in her book Mother Nature (1999) has taken these 
understandings further, from an evolutionist point of view.  She has  proposed 
that the vulnerable conditions of infants in hunter-gatherer societies have led 
to  the selection of certain ‘survival strategies’ to become genetically encoded 
in the constitution of human infants. They are at  risk of abandonment by their 
mothers, and to competition from siblings, in conditions of scarcity.  
Furthermore they are at risk should their mother find herself with a sexual 
partner who is not the infant’s own father.  Thus, Hrdy argues, human infants 
have evolved to  be highly attractive to their parents, and indeed to adults in 
general, as well as having a piercing capacity to make any distress or fear 
they may feel known to all in their locality.     
 
More unexpectedly, Hrdy’s evolutionary perspective, drawing on the 
sociobiological work of Robert Trivers (2002)  explains why there is an 
inherent ambivalence in the relationship between infants and their mothers, 
and between infants and siblings, and why infants have reason for suspicion 
of   parental sexual activity which is likely to lead to the birth of new babies, 
and thus competitors. As the philosopher Jim Hopkins (2003)  has pointed 
out,   Melanie Klein’s description (Klein 1975)  of the anxieties and inner 
conflicts inherent  in the relationships of early infancy, so at odds with 
sentimental idealisation of the mother-infant bond, finds a new support in 
these conjectures.  In Hrdy’s view, even the mother and her and the baby’s 
placenta may be competitors for survival in times of scarcity, as well as later 
the mother and her newborn infant.  Hrdy makes clear why it is that the 
abandonment of infants at extreme moments has been a rational survival 
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strategy.  The potential for conflict between mother and infant, for Oedipal 
anxieties concerning  father,  and possible displacement by new babies,  and 
mothers’ capacity for anxiety concerning  their capacity to sustain their babies 
(and their need for support in doing so) are rendered more intelligible if we 
think ourselves back to the hunter-gatherer era in which human  genetic 
endowments were set down. 
 
The research of Bowlbian attachment theorists, and of  psychoanalysts in the 
British object-relations tradition who share some presuppositions with them, 
has developed within a particular ethical perspective, linked to a commitment 
to  renewed social integration and community solidarity which was influential 
in Britain in the post-war period in which Bowlby began his work.  Evolutionist 
arguments about  ‘human nature’ have thus been deployed in support of a 
preferred conception of social relations. This need not be an illicit procedure, 
so long as it is recognised that such descriptions of the consequences of 
different kinds of social organisation (including patterns of child-rearing) do 
not replace moral judgements, by conflating fact and value, but do identify 
some  factual constraints on choices between feasible  ways of life.  
 
Sociological Darwinism 
 
Now to the application of Darwinist perspectives to sociological and 
anthropological analysis.  I agree with Geoffey Hodgson that the distinction 
between genotype and phenotype seems fundamental to making use of the 
Darwinian analogy for the understanding of social development, since it is so 
central to Darwin’s own theory. (Roughly speaking, in nature, if you are a 
sparrow there is no point in learning to swim.)  In society, what are the 
equivalent limits to individuals’ freedom of action, and how far do Darwinian 
processes of variation and replication  help in understanding them?  It was a 
major contribution of sociology and anthropology to show that there were such 
limits, or to put this is another way, that  choices always have to negotiated 
within a field of possibilities.  Such limits may be determined by culture (what 
it is possible to think or feel within a given milieu), by the distribution of power, 
and  by material resources, in various combinations. ‘Men make history, but in 
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circumstances not of their own choosing,’ as Marx put it. The question is how 
far do Darwinian ideas improve on the various classical sociological framings 
of this question, which have tended  to focus, within the traditions of the 
subject  (Durkheim, Weber, Marx and their descendants)  on one or other of 
these three ‘power dimensions’ (Giddens 1971). The question is whether  
Darwinism contributes a distinctive new mode of explanation, in addition to 
explanations by reference to genetic templates (e.g. hunter-gatherer or 
mammalian dispositions) whose positive value I have discussed above. 
 
 
The problem seems to be that the more  Darwinian accounts seek to 
accommodate the facts of cultural transmission, and to take account of what 
in evolutionary debates is termed the ‘inheritance of acquired characteristics’, 
the more they  depart from the framing  of Darwin’s own theory, in the  
direction of the Lamarckian position which Darwin’s theory of natural selection 
defeated.  The clarity of the Darwinian programme, which has been 
maintained throughout its successive stages from Darwin, through Mendel’s 
idea  of  genes and chromosomes, to the biochemical and informational 
mapping of the genome,  lies in the fact that  inheritable characteristics – what 
Geoff Hodgson refers to above as replicators, remain conceptually and in 
reality to a large degree distinct from the processes by which they are 
selected. ‘Variation’ and ‘selection’ take place so to speak in different 
conceptual spaces.    
 
How far can this separation be sustained in extensions of Darwinian thinking 
to  the social and cultural spheres?  I would like to suggest a distinction 
between those social forms in which the separation between ‘variation’ and 
‘selection’ is strong, and those where it is weak or absent. Example of the 
former are producer markets in which incremental innovations are ‘selected 
for’ by competition, scientific activity where variations are ‘selected’ by the 
decisions of a larger scientific community, and innovations in art forms, where 
once again  selection of successful variants (new genres, forms, or  
techniques) is independent of their production. All of these analogues to 
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Darwinian competition seem, incidentally, to be products of liberal kinds of 
social organisation.   
 
Contrast these with systems where power holders successfully control 
variation (in the economy, in the arts, in ideas) as a primary strategy for 
maintaining their dominance.  State socialism is such an instance.  In one 
system, variation and selection are (deliberately) structured as separate 
processes, in the other, such separation is vigorously resisted. Very different 
patterns of innovation, diffusion and selection will obtain in these different 
systems.  In so far as Darwinism is to be seen as a resource for 
understanding specific patterns of innovation and diffusion (as in the work 
described above by Ruth Mace) it will have  different  applications in the two 
cases.  In the first, these may be quite close to its biological and ecological 
source field, in the latter more remote from it. 2 
 
One can argue that on a larger social  scale, there will be competition 
between these systems themselves, as in the Cold War between capitalism 
and communism, or nowadays perhaps in a struggle for dominance between 
more and less regulated  forms of capitalism.  But there seem likely to be 
great differences in the form of application of Darwinist models at these 
different levels, and where the modes of variation and selection are so 
differently configured. To call of these forms of contest and competition 
‘Darwinist seems to achieve an apparent universal scope at the expense of 
explanatory precision.  
 
It seems an interesting fact about the Darwinist paradigm that its most precise 
application is to forms of structured competition  which occur and are valued 
within a particular kind of social order.  ‘Social Darwinism’ in its early 
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 The ‘actor network’ theory of Bruno Latour and his colleagues (Latour 2005)  considerably 
complicates the idealised model which posits a state of ‘perfect competition’  between 
scientists and their discoveries. The success and spread of  depends on the conceptual  links 
they are able to establish in various fields, and also on the substantive alliances that scientists 
are able to achieve with for example funding sources who can sustain further research. This 
suggests that modelling the processes of variation and selection in science (and other fields) 
is much more complex than a classical conception of ‘separation’ can capture.  Agency is 
assigned to many kinds of ‘actant’, human and non-human, in Latour’s view.  There may be 
fruitful links  to be made here with Darwinian mappings.  
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nineteenth century days was  mapped on to an ideology of unbridled 
economic individualism, which led to the rejection of Darwinism by many 
sociologists, even  to this day.  But if we see that the application of Darwinist 
principles to social explanation now requires the understanding not only of the 
processes of  competition,  but also of the institutional and regulatory 
conditions necessary to sustain them, we can see the possibilities for a 
Darwinism which is  more genuinely social than hitherto.  
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